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ABSTRACT
This research analyzed 523 accidents in the R.O.C. Air Force between 1978 and 2002
using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework described
by Wiegmann & Shappell (2003). This study provides an understanding, based upon
empirical evidence, of how actions and decisions at higher levels in the organization to result
in operational errors and accidents. Suggestions are made about intervention strategies
focusing on the categories at higher levels of HFACS. Specific targets for remedial safety
actions should be aimed in the areas that share the strongest and greatest number of
significant associations with ‘Organizational Influences’ (for example, ‘organizational
process’, ‘inadequate supervision’ and ‘Crew Resource Management’). The greatest gains
in safety benefit could be achieved by targeting these areas. Furthermore, this study also
demonstrates that the HFACS framework is a useful tool for guiding accident investigations
and for targeting potentially cost-effective remedial safety actions for breaking the chain of
accidents.
Keywords: Accident Investigation; Human Error; Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS)
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INTRODUCTION
In accident investigation, it is easier to identify the cause with factual proof for hardware
failures than for human failure. The role of human error in aircraft accidents is a topic of
much scientific debate. There are a number of perspectives for describing and analyzing
human errors, each based on different assumptions about their nature and the underlying
causal factors of the human contribution in the sequence of events leading up to an accident.
Accidents, especially those involving human errors, normally are associated with a chain of
events --- a series of problems which degrade the performance of the equipment, the
crewman, or both until the accidents are inevitable (Diehl, 1989). Feggetter (1991) suggested
that the role of psychologists who investigate accidents is to collect and make a detailed
examination of the large amounts of information associated with human errors and to gain a
complete understanding of the surrounding circumstances. By examining and correlating
information across a number of accidents, predictors may be identified which may then be
applied to individual crews or situations in order to developing the effective prevention
strategies for breaking the chain leading to accidents.
Helmreich (1994) suggested that despite impressive technological advances, aircraft
accidents continue to happen, and it is now suggested that humans, primarily the aircraft pilot
and crew, are the weak link in the aviation safety chain. In general aviation, pilots are
assessed as being the cause of accidents in over 80% of cases and that more than half of these
accidents are the result of poor pilot judgment (Trollip & Jensen, 1991). As aircraft have
become increasingly more reliable, human performance has played a proportionately
increasing role in the causation of accidents. As a result, many human factors accident
analysis frameworks, taxonomies and analysis strategies have been devised over the years
(e.g. Diehl, 1989; Harle; 1995; Hollnagel, 1998; Hunter & Baker, 2000). The Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) developed by Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) is
the most commonly used and is the one used herein as a basis for the current work.
HFACS is a generic human error framework originally developed for US military
aviation as a tool for the analysis of the human factors aspects of accidents. It is based on
Reason's (1990) system-wide model of human error in which active failures are associated
with the performance of front-line operators in complex systems and latent failures are
characterized as inadequacies or mis-specifications which might lie dormant within a system
for a long time and are only triggered when combined with other factors to breach the
system’s defenses. These latent failures are spawned in the upper management levels of the
organization. As Reason (1997) noted, complex systems are designed, operated, maintained
and managed by human beings, so it is not surprising that human decisions and actions are
implicated in all organizational accidents. Reason’s model revolutionized the manner in
which the role of human error in aviation accidents was viewed but it did not provide a
detailed method for the analysis of aviation accidents and mishaps. However, Wiegmann
and Shappell developed the HFACS to fulfill such a need. The development of HFACS is
described in a series of books and papers (e.g. Shappell & Wiegmann 2001; 2003 & 2004;
and Wiegmann & Shappell 1997; 2001a; 2001b; 2001c & 2003). Wiegmann & Shappell
(2001b) suggest that the HFACS framework bridges the gap between theory and practice by
providing safety professionals with a theoretically based tool for identifying and classifying
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human errors. The tool focuses on both latent and active failures and their inter-
relationships, and it facilitates the identification of the underlying causes of human error.
However, as aviation accidents are often the result of a number of causes, the challenge for
accident investigators is how best to identify and mitigate the causal sequence of events
leading up to an accident.
HFACS examines human error at four levels. Each higher level is assumed to affect the
next downward level in the HFACS framework (see figure 1).
 Level-1 ‘Unsafe acts of operators’: This level is where the majority of causes of accidents
are focused. Such causes can be classified into the two basic categories of errors and
violations.
 Level-2 ‘Preconditions for unsafe acts’: This level addresses the latent failures within the
causal sequence of events as well as more obvious active failures. It also describes the
context of substandard conditions of operators and the substandard practices they adopt.
 Level-3 ‘Unsafe supervision’: This level traces the causal chain of events producing
unsafe acts up to the front-line supervisors.
 Level-4 ‘Organizational influences’: This level encompasses the most elusive of these
latent failures, fallible decisions of upper levels of management which directly affect
supervisory practices, as well as the conditions and actions of front-line operators.
Wiegmann and Shappell (2001a) reported that the framework as a whole had an inter-
rater reliability figure (using Cohen’s Kappa) of 0.71, indicating substantial agreement,
however no figures were reported for the individual HFACS categories. Li and Harris (2005)
conducted further research and found the inter-rater reliabilities for the individual categories
in the HFACS framework (assessed using Cohen’s Kappa) ranged between 0.440 and 0.826,
a range of values spanning between moderate agreement and substantial agreement.
Fourteen HFACS categories exceeded a Kappa of 0.60, which indicates substantial
agreement. Four categories had Kappa values between 0.40 and 0.59 indicating only
moderate levels of agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977).
Maurino, Reason, Johnston and Lee (1995) suggested that it is important to understand
how decisions made by people at the sharp-end (in this case, pilots) are influenced by the
actions of the people at the blunt-end of their operating worlds, the higher levels in their
organizations. However, there is little empirical work formally describing the hypothesized
relationship between organizational structures, psychological pre-cursors of accidents and the
actual errors committed by pilots. This research investigated 523 accidents in the ROC Air
Force occurring between 1978 and 2002 through the application of the HFACS. The
objective was to provide probabilities for the co-occurrence of categories across adjacent
levels of the HFACS to establish how factors in the upper (organizational) levels in the
framework affect categories in lower (operational) levels. Once the significant paths in the
framework have been identified, the development of accident intervention strategies should
proceed more rapidly and effectively for breaking the chain leading to accidents.
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Figure 1 The HFACS framework, each upper level would affect downward level, proposed
by Wiegmann & Shappell (2003)
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METHOD
Data
The data were derived from the narrative descriptions of accidents occurring in the
R.O.C. Air Force between 1978 and 2002. The data set comprised of 523 accidents
occurring during this 25-year period of time. For each accident, the 24-hour on call
Investigator-In-Charge follows a standard procedure for conducting the investigation. The
initial stage collects relevant information for further analysis including the accident
classification; identification details; pilots’ information; personnel involved; aircraft
information; mission and flight details; history of flight; impact and post-impact information;
meteorological information; radar information and transmissions to and from Tactical Air
Traffic Control. The wreckage of the aircraft is then recovered for investigation by the
engineering teams. The final report details the causal factors of the accident and contains
recommendations for accident prevention.
Classification framework
This study used the version of the HFACS framework described in Wiegmann &
Shappell (2003). The first (operational) level of HFACS categorizes events under the general
heading of ‘unsafe acts of operators’ that can lead to an accident. This comprises of four
sub-categories of 'decision errors'; 'skill-based errors'; 'perceptual errors' and 'violations'. The
second level of HFACS concerns 'preconditions for unsafe acts' which has seven further sub-
categories: 'adverse mental states'; 'adverse physiological states'; 'physical/mental
limitations'; 'crew resource management'; 'personal readiness'; 'physical environment', and
'technological environment'. The third level of HFACS is ‘unsafe supervision’ which
includes 'inadequate supervision'; 'planned inappropriate operation'; 'failure to correct known
problem', and 'supervisory violation'. The fourth and highest level of HFACS is
‘organizational influences’ and comprises of the sub-categories of 'resource management';
'organizational climate' and 'organizational process'. HFACS is described diagrammatically
in figure 1.
Coding process
Each accident report was coded independently by two investigators, an instructor pilot
and an aviation psychologist. These investigators were trained on the use of the HFACS
framework together for 10 hours to ensure that they achieved a detailed and accurate
understanding of its categories. The presence or absence of each HFACS category was
assessed in each report narrative. To avoid over-representation from any single accident, each
HFACS category was counted a maximum of only once per accident.
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Statistical analysis
Chi-square (2) analyses of the cross-tabulations to measure the statistical strength of
association between the categories in the higher and lower levels of the HFACS were used.
As the 2 test is a simple test of association these analyses were supplemented with further
analyses using Goodman and Kruskall’s lambda (λ) which was used to calculate the 
proportional reduction in error (PRE). Goodman and Kruskall’s lambda has the advantage of
being a directional statistic. The lower level categories in the HFACS were designated as
being dependent upon the categories at the immediately higher level in the framework, which
is congruent with the theoretical assumptions underlying HFACS. The value for lambda
indicates the strength of the relationship, with the higher levels in the HFACS being deemed
to influence (cause) changes at the lower organizational levels, thus going beyond what may
be deemed a simple test of co-occurrence between categories. Finally, odds ratios were also
calculated which provided an estimate of the likelihood of the presence of a contributory
factor in one HFACS category being associated concomitantly with the presence of a factor
in another category. However, it must be noted that as odds ratios are an asymmetric
measure they are only really theoretically meaningful when associated with a non-zero value
for lambda. From a theoretical standpoint, lower levels in the HFACS cannot adversely
affect higher levels.
RESULTS
The frequency of occurrence the individual causal factors coded in the analysis of the 523
accidents is given in table 1. In these accidents, 1,762 instances of human error were
recorded within the HFACS framework. Initial results found that acts at the level of ‘unsafe
acts of operators’ were involved in 725 (41.1%) of instances; the ‘preconditions for unsafe
acts’ level was as a causal factor in 552 (31.3%) of instances; the ‘unsafe supervision’ level
was involved in 221 (12.5%) of instances, and the ‘organizational influences’ level in the
HFACS model was involved as a factor in 264 (15 %) of instances. Relatively few
categories had exceptionally low counts. Only the categories of ‘organizational climate’
(level-4); ‘supervisory violation’ (level-3) and ‘adverse physiological state’ (level-2) failed to
achieve double figures.
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Table I Frequency and percentage counts for each HFACS category for all 523 accidents.
Analysis of the strength of association between categories at HFACS level-4
‘organizational influences’ and HFACS level-3 ‘unsafe supervision’ found that out of a
possible 12 relationships there were eight pairs of significant associations between categories
at adjacent levels. ‘Organizational process’ was significantly associated with all four
supervisory factors at level-3: ‘inadequate supervision’; ‘planned inappropriate operations’;
‘failed to correct a known problem’; and ‘supervisory violations’. ‘Organizational climate’
was significantly associated with ‘inadequate supervision’; ‘failed to correct a known
problem’; and ‘supervisory violations’. ‘Resource management’ was significantly associated
with only one category at level-3, ‘inadequate supervision’. Further examination of the
directional PRE showed two significant associations between categories at level-4 and level-
3; ‘organizational climate’ with ‘inadequate supervision’ and ‘organizational process’ with
‘inadequate supervision’. It should be noted, though, that only four instances were observed
in which ‘organizational climate’ was implicated as a contributory factor. As a result, any
associations involving this category should be treated with extreme caution. The association
between ‘organizational process’ with ‘inadequate supervision’ also had a high odds ratio,
suggesting that poor supervisory practices were over 13 times more likely to occur when
associated with poor higher level managerial processes in the air force. These statistically
significant relationships are summarized in table 2 and are described diagrammatically in
figure 2.
HFACS Category
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Level-4
Organizational
Influences
Organizational process 76 14.5
Organizational climate 4 0.8
Resource management 184 35.2
Level-3
Unsafe Supervision
Supervisory violation 8 1.5
Failed to correct a known problem 12 2.3
Planned inadequate operations 24 4.6
Inadequate supervision 177 33.8
Level-2
Preconditions for
Unsafe Acts
Technology environment 44 8.4
Physical environment 74 14.1
Personal readiness 29 5.5
Crew resource management 146 27.9
Physical/mental limitation 73 14.0
Adverse physiological states 2 0.4
Adverse mental states 184 35.2
Level-1
Unsafe Acts of
Operators
Violations 160 30.6
Perceptual errors 116 22.2
Skilled-based errors 226 43.2
Decision errors 223 42.6
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Table II Chi-square test of association, Goodman and Kruskall’s Lambda and Odds
ratios summarizing significant associations between categories at the level of
‘organizational influences’ and ‘unsafe supervision’
ns: not significant
nc: not computed due to a zero frequency in one cell of the contingency table
Analysis of the strength of association between categories at HFACS level-3 ‘unsafe
supervision’ and HFACS level-2 ‘preconditions for unsafe acts’ showed that out of a total
number of 28 possible comparisons, a further eight pairs of significant associations between
categories at adjacent levels were found. ‘Inadequate supervision’ showed significant
statistical associations with five categories; ‘adverse mental states’; ‘physical/mental
limitations’; ‘crew resource management’; ‘personal readiness’; and ‘physical environment’.
‘Planned inappropriate operations’ had significant relationships with two level-2 categories;
‘adverse mental states’; and ‘crew resource management’. ‘Failed to correct a known
problem’ was significantly associated with the lower level category of ‘adverse mental
states’. These significant associations are summarized in table 3 and in figure 2. Further
examination of the directional PRE found that there was a significant association between the
level-3 and level-2 categories of ‘inadequate supervision’ and ‘crew resource management’.
This relationship also had a high odds ratio, suggesting that poor supervisory practices were
almost 13 times more likely to subsequently result in poor CRM.
Organizational Influence
With
Unsafe Supervision
Pearson Chi-square Lambda
Odds
RatioValue df p Value P
Resource Management * Inadequate Supervision 13.525 1 <.001 .000 ns 0.473
Organizational climate * Inadequate Supervision 7.562 1 <.006 .023 <.045 nc
Organizational climate * Failed to correct known problem 39.753 1 <.001 .000 ns 49.500
Organizational climate * Supervisory violation 61.121 1 <.001 .000 ns 83.167
Organizational process * Inadequate Supervision 91.208 1 <.001 .282 <.001 13.561
Organizational process * Planned inappropriate operations 14.174 1 <.001 .000 ns 4.535
Organizational process *Failed to correct a known problem 11.899 1 <.001 .000 ns 6.100
Organizational process * Supervisory violation 46.307 1 <.001 .000 ns nc
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Table III Chi-square test of association, Goodman and Kruskall’s Lambda and Odds
ratios summarizing significant associations between categories at the level of
‘unsafe supervision’ and ‘precondition for unsafe acts’
ns: not significant
nc: not computed due to a zero frequency in one cell of the contingency table
Analysis of the strength of association between categories at HFACS level-2
‘preconditions for unsafe acts’ and HFACS level-1 ‘unsafe acts of operators’ showed a
further 16 pairs of significant associations out of a possible 28. The level-2 category of
‘adverse mental states’ exhibited significant statistical associations with four level-1
categories; ‘decision errors’; ‘skill-based errors’; ‘perceptual errors’; and ‘violations’. ‘Crew
resource management’ was also associated with four lower-level categories in the HFACS
framework; ‘decision errors’; ‘skill-based errors’; ‘perceptual errors’; and ‘violations’.
‘Physical/mental limitations’ was associated with three categories; ‘decision errors’; ‘skill-
based errors’; and ‘perceptual errors’. The ‘technology environment’ was also statistically
associated with a further three level-1 categories; ‘decision errors’; ‘skill-based errors’; and
‘perceptual errors’. Finally, ‘personal readiness’ was associated with ‘decision errors’ and
‘skill-based errors’. Further examination of the directional PRE found that there were eight
significant associations between level-2 and level-1 categories. These were ‘adverse mental
states’ with ‘decision errors’ and ‘skill-based errors’; ‘physical/mental limitations’ with
‘decision errors’ and ‘skill-based errors’; ‘crew resource management’ with ‘decision errors’
and ‘skill-based errors’; and ‘personal readiness’ with the categories of ‘decision errors’ and
‘skill-based errors’. These significant statistical relationships are summarized in table 4 and
are described diagrammatically in figure 2. All these significant associations were associated
with high odds ratios, suggesting that inadequate performance in the higher level HFACS
Unsafe Supervision
With
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
Pearson Chi-square Lambda
Odds
ratioValue
df P Value p
Inadequate Supervision * Adverse mental states 29.545 1 <.001 .038 ns 2.824
Inadequate Supervision *Physical/mental limitation 7.945 1 <.005 .000 ns 2.036
Inadequate Supervision * CRM 143.573 1 <.001 .281 <.002 12.780
Inadequate Supervision * Personal readiness 10.101 1 <.001 .000 ns 3.304
Inadequate Supervision * Physical environment 6.604 1 <.010 .000 ns 0.469
Planned inappropriate operations *Adverse mental
states
5.730 1 <.020 .022 ns 2.594
Planned inappropriate operations *CRM 10.824 1 <.001 .027 ns 3.744
Failed to correct a known problem * Adverse mental states 6.958 1 <.008 .000 ns nc
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categories was associated with much increased likelihood of poor performance at the lower
levels.
Table IV Chi-square test of association, Goodman and Kruskall’s Lambda and Odds ratios
summarizing significant associations between categories at the level of
‘precondition for unsafe acts’ and ‘unsafe acts of operators’
ns: not significant
nc: not computed due to a zero frequency in one cell of the contingency table
DISCUSSION
It can be seen from the data presented in table 1 that the vast majority of HFACS
categories had large numbers of instances of occurrence in the data set, which allows
reasonable confidence in the results of the statistical analyses and the pattern of results
obtained. Reason (1990 & 1997) has suggested that there is a ‘many to one’ mapping of the
psychological precursors of unsafe acts and the actual errors themselves, making it difficult
to predict which actual errors will occur as a result of which preconditions. This research,
using the HFACS framework developed by Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) goes some way to
supporting this assertion. There are statistically significant associations between causal
factors at higher organizational levels, the psychological contributory factors and the errors
Precondition for Unsafe Acts
With
Unsafe Acts of Operators
Pearson Chi-square Lambda
Odds ratioValue df p Value P
Adverse mental state * Decision errors 59.226 1 <.001 .269 <.001 4.364
Adverse mental states * Skill-based errors 61.701 1 <.001 .283 <.001 4.518
Adverse mental states * Perceptual errors 43.730 1 <.001 .000 ns 4.106
Adverse mental states * Violations 13.025 1 <.001 .000 ns 2.019
Physical/mental limitation * Decision errors 50.996 1 <.001 .211 <.001 7.730
Physical/mental limitation * Skill-based errors 33.051 1 <.001 .164 <.001 4.735
Physical/mental limitation * Perceptual errors 27.401 1 <.001 .000 ns 3.764
CRM * Decision errors 42.578 1 <.001 .215 <.001 3.724
CRM * Skill-based errors 35.423 1 <.001 .195 <.001 3.299
CRM * Perceptual errors 62.086 1 <.001 .000 ns 5.435
CRM * Violations 19.850 1 <.001 .000 ns 2.462
Personal readiness * Decision errors 10.220 1 <.001 .058 <.015 3.613
Personal readiness * Skill-based errors 15.181 1 <.001 .075 <.001 5.231
Technology environment * Decision errors 3.982 1 <.046 .000 ns 0.509
Technology environment * Skill-based errors 5.724 1 <.017 .000 ns 0.440
Technology environment * Perceptual errors 6.982 1 <.008 .000 ns 0.228
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committed by pilots (see tables 2-4 and figure 2). However, some care needs to be taken
when interpreting the statistical relationships presented within HFACS. In a few categories
(noted earlier) the frequency counts are small. Furthermore, the frequency counts within
categories were all derived from accidents. It is unknown (and unknowable) how often
instances within the various HFACS categories have occurred in day-to-day operations that
have not resulted in an accident. Thus, the relationships between HFACS levels and
categories should not be interpreted outside the accident causal sequence. It should also be
noted that only in those cases where a significant 2 test of association is accompanied by a
significant value for lambda can it be assumed that the categories in the lower levels of the
HFACS framework were dependent upon the higher-level categories, as is congruent with
the underpinning theory.
Means the category has no significant association with downward level categories
Means Chi-square significant; Means both Chi-square and Lambda significant
Figure II. Paths between categories at the four levels in the HFACS framework showing the
significant associations using Chi-square (2) and Lambda (λ) 
Orasanu and Connolly (1993) have suggested that decision-making occurs in an
organizational context, and that the organization influences decisions directly by stipulating
standard operating procedures, and indirectly through the organization’s norms and culture.
Reason (1990) proposed that latent conditions are present in all systems and they are an
inevitable part of organizational life. For example, resources are normally distributed
unequally in organizations. The original decision on how to allocate resources may have
Adverse
physiological
states
Physical
environment
Skill-based errors
Adverse
mental
states
Personal
readiness
Crew resource
management
Physical
/mental
limitation
Technology
environment
Inadequate supervision Planed inadequate
operations
Failed to correct a known
problem
Supervisory
violation
Resource
management
Organizational climate Organizational process
Decision errors
Level-4
Level-3
Level-2
Level-1
Perceptual errors Violations
ISASI 2006 Annual Air Safety Seminar Cancun, Mexico September 14-17 2006
12
been based on sound commercial arguments but such inequities may create reliability or
safety problems for someone somewhere in the system at some later point. This analysis
showed that at HFACS level-4, ‘organizational influences’, all the categories had some
association with causal factors at level-3 (‘unsafe supervision’). However, the category of
‘organizational process’ is the key factor at this highest organizational level. Poor
‘organizational processes’ were associated with inadequacies in all categories at the level of
‘unsafe supervision’ and hence indirectly were ultimately at the root of many operational
errors resulting in accidents. Well-developed ‘organizational processes’ that are consistently
adhered to are key to all safety management systems. The commitment to safety must come
from the very highest levels of the organization if it is to be successful in this respect
(Reason, 1997). Both Reason (1990) and Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) hypothesized that
inappropriate decision-making by upper-level management can adversely influence the
personnel and practices at the supervisory level, which in turn affects the psychological pre-
conditions and hence the subsequent actions of the front-line operators. This study provides
statistical support for this hypothesized relationship. Furthermore, the odds ratios associated
with ‘supervisory failures’ were over 13 times more likely to occur in the presence of a
concomitant failure in the category of ‘organizational process’ (see table 2).
Wojcik (1989) proposed that some conditions are studied by psychologists and are
reasonably well understood, such as work schedules that allow adequate sleep. However,
other conditions related to management and organizational factors are more difficult to
observe and quantify. At present the accident causal factors cited by investigation authorities
usually, though not always, emphasize technology, the physical environment and the more
immediate human factors, an emphasis partly due to the 'stop rules' of investigators when
searching for accident causes (Rasmussen, 1988). The category of ‘inadequate supervision’
was the key factor at HFACS level-3. It had many, significant statistical associations with
categories in level-2, however, there was only one significant ‘causal’ relationship observed,
which was with the level-2 category of ‘Crew Resource Management’. The failure of senior
officers in a supervisory position to provide guidance and operational doctrine to pilots was
associated with many forms of psychological precursor that subsequently resulted in active,
operational failures. Again, the values for the odds ratios associated with ‘supervisory
failures’ and several level-2 categories strongly suggest that this is a key area for breaking
the chain leading to accidents. This suggests that accident investigations should be pursued
further back into the organization than is often the case at present.
Reason (1990) suggested that human behavior is governed by the interplay between
psychological and situational factors. The pre-conditions for unsafe acts (level-2) show a
number of strong statistical relationships with the active failures of the operators at level-1.
In many cases the relationships uncovered in the data suggest a strong ‘causal’ influence of
the higher-level HFACS categories on the level-1 errors. These level-2 factors show
Reason’s classic ‘many to one’ mapping of psychological precursors to active failures in all
of the level-1 categories with the exception of ‘violations’ which is only closely related to
two higher level categories suggesting that a completely different mechanism is at play here
to cause such failures (see figure 2).
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Some aspects, however, are almost out of the control of even the higher levels of the
organization. It is interesting to note that the level-2 category of the ‘technological
environment’ (which is essentially concerned with such factors as the quality of cockpit
interfaces) is not at all influenced by the higher managerial levels. However, it has a
significant association with several HFACS level-1 categories. This is probably a result of
the higher levels in the ROC Air Force chain of command having little or no influence on the
cockpit design of their aircraft. Indeed, it is often the case in the military that those
responsible for the design and/or procurement of large pieces of equipment are in entirely
different organizations to the operators of these systems. Those responsible for the
technology environment are not actually in the same management hierarchy as the people
using it.
It will be noted from the results presented in tables 2 to 4 (and in figure 2) that even
though there were a considerable number of statistically significant associations between
HFACS categories at adjacent organizational levels, there were relatively few ‘causal’
relationships, where the lower level categories were statistically dependent upon higher-level
categories. This may lead to the suggestion that unlike the proposition expounded in the
HFACS model (and in its associated underlying theory) organizational influences are not
always unidirectional. People at lower levels in the organization may, in some
circumstances, adversely influence behavior at higher managerial levels. It is conceivable
that pilots exhibiting ‘poor personal readiness’, an ‘adverse mental state’ or who had
‘physical or mental limitations’ could cause problems which resulted in ‘inadequate
supervision’. On the other hand, though, it is difficult to see how ‘decision errors’ could
cause an ‘adverse mental state’. The results obtained suggest that the HFACS framework
needs to be modified slightly to encompass a more dynamic view of organizations.
The results suggest that interventions at HFACS levels 1 and 2 would only have limited
effect in improving overall safety. As an example, improving CRM practices alone is
unlikely to have a major impact on safety unless the supervisory processes (level-3) and
organizational processes (level-4) are in place to provide facilities; oversee CRM training;
monitor its effectiveness and respond to any further changes required in the training program.
All of these activities require organizational commitment and capacity, which can only be
provided from the highest levels of management. Furthermore, on a ‘dollar-for-dollar’ basis,
interventions at higher levels are also likely to be more cost effective in terms of the net
safety benefits they realize. Specific targets for remedial safety action should be aimed in the
areas that share the strongest and greatest number of significant associations with lower
levels in the organization (for example, ‘organizational process’, ‘inadequate supervision’
and ‘Crew Resource Management’. All of these categories are also at the root of paths of
association with other HFACS categories that have very high values for the odds ratios
associated with them which further suggests that the greatest gains in safety benefit could be
achieved by targeting these areas.
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CONCLUSIONS
There is a growing awareness of the role of management and organizational factors in
aviation accidents (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). There is an explicit relationship between
organizational conditions and the individual psychological factors affecting safety
performance. It is important to understand how the errors committed by pilots are influenced
by the actions of management at the higher levels in their organizations (Maurino et al.,
1995). If the aviation industry wants to achieve the goal of significantly reducing the
aviation accident rate these organizational and human factors must be addressed. Before
research efforts can be systematically refocused, a comprehensive analysis of existing
databases needs to be conducted to determine the most prevalent underlying organizational
factors, as well as the more immediate human factors responsible for aviation accidents and
incidents. Furthermore, if these efforts are to be sustained, appropriate human factors
investigation methods and techniques will need to be developed so that data gathered during
human factors accident investigations can be improved, and analysis of the underlying causes
of human error facilitated (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001c). This study provides an
understanding, based upon empirical evidence, of how actions and decisions at higher levels
in the organization promulgate throughout the R.O.C. Air Force to result in operational errors
and accidents. There are clearly defined, statistically-described paths that relate errors at
level-1 (the operational level) with inadequacies at both the immediately adjacent and higher
levels in the organization. The accidents and incidents analyzed all occurred in the ROC Air
Force thus the patterns of inter-relationships reported may be culturally specific. However
there is no reason why this analytical methodology cannot be employed on other data sets to
establish if the patterns observed hold good in other cultures, thereby providing further
empirical evidence to support the HFACS methodology. This research draws a clear picture
that supports Reason’s (1990) model of active failures resulting from latent conditions in the
organization. Furthermore, the HFACS framework has been proven to be a useful tool for
guiding accident investigations and for targeting potentially cost-effective remedial safety
actions for breaking accidents chain.
REFERENCES
1. Diehl, A. (1989). Human Performance/System Safety Issues in Aircraft Accident
Investigation and Prevention. Fifth International Symposium on Aviation
Psychology (pp. 838-847). The Ohio State University.
2. Feggetter, A. J. (1991). The Development of an Intelligent Human Factors Data Base as an
Aid for the Investigation of Aircraft Accidents. Sixth International Symposium on
Aviation Psychology (pp. 324-629). The Ohio State University.
3. Harle, P. G. (1995). Investigation of Human Factors: the link to accident prevention. N.
McDonald , R. Johnston, & R. Fuller (Editor), Applications of Psychology to the
Aviation System (pp. 101-107). Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing.
4. Helmreich, R. L. (1994). Anatomy of a System Accident: The Crash of Avianca Flight 025.
The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 4(3), 265-284.
ISASI 2006 Annual Air Safety Seminar Cancun, Mexico September 14-17 2006
15
5. Hollnagel, E. (1998). Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method. Oxford, England:
Elsevier Science.
6. Hunter, D. R., & Baker, R. M. (2000). Reducing Accidents among General Aviation Pilots
through a National Aviation Safety Program. The Fourth Australian Aviation
Psychology Symposium Aldershot, England: Ashgate.
7. Landis, J. R. , & Koch, G. G. (1977). The Measurment of Observer Agreement for
Categorical Data . Biometrics, 33, 159-174.
8. Li, W. C., & Harris, D. (2005). HFACS Analysis of ROC Air Force Aviation Accidents:
reliability analysis and cross-cultural comparison. International Journal of Applied
Aviation Studies, 5(1), 65-81.
9. Maurino, D. E., Reason, J., Johnston, N., & Lee, R. B. (1995). Beyond Aviation Human
Factors. England: Ashgate Publishing.
10. Orasanu, J., & Connolly, T. (1993). The Reinvention of Decision Making. G. A. Klein, J.
Orasanu, R. Calderwood, & C. E. Zsambok (Editor), Decision Making in Action:
Models and Methods (pp. 3-20). Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex.
11. Rasmussen, J. (1988). Human Error Mechanisms in Complex Work Environments.
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 22, 155-167.
12. Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. New York: Cambridge University.
13. Reason, J. (1997). Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Aldershot, England:
Ashgate.
14. Shappell, S. A., & Wiegmann, D. A. (2001). Applying Reason: the human factors analysis
and classification system (HFACS). Human Factors and Aerospace Safety, 1(1),
59-86.
15. Shappell, S. A., & Wiegmann, D. A. (2004). HFACS Analysis of Military and Civilian
Aviation Accidents: A North American Comparison. International Society of Air
Safety Investigators (pp. 2-8). Queensland.
16. Shappell, S. A., & Wiegmann, D. A. (2003). (Report No. DOT/FAA/AM-03/4).
Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration.
17. Trollip, S. R., & Jensen, R. S. (1991). Human factors for general aviation. Englewood,CO:
Jeppesen Sanderson.
18. Wiegmann, D. A., & Shappell, S. A. (2001a). Applying the Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System to the Analysis of Commerical Aviation Accident Data.
Eleventh International Symposium on Aviation Psychology The Ohio State
University.
19. Wiegmann, D. A., & Shappell, S. A. (2001b). Human Error Perspectives in Aviation. The
International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 11(4), 341-357.
20. Wiegmann, D. A., & Shappell, S. A. (2001c). Human Error Analysis of Commerical
Aviation Accidents: Application of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine , 72(11), 1006-1016.
ISASI 2006 Annual Air Safety Seminar Cancun, Mexico September 14-17 2006
16
21. Wiegmann, D. A., & Shappell, S. A. (2003). A Human Error Approach to Aviation
Accident Analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System.
Aldershot, England: Ashgate.
22. Wiegmann, D. A., & Shappell, S. A. (1997). Human Factors Analysis of Postaccident Data:
Applying Theoretical Taxonomies of Human Error. The International Journal of
Aviation Psychology, 7(1), 67-81.
23. Wojcik, L. A. (1989). Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Aviation System Safety. Fifth
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology (pp. 402-407). The Ohio State
University.
